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Abstract 
This paper argues that both criminologists and lawyers need a far more 
philosophically robust account of joint action, notably as it relates to technical 
matters of intentionality and responsibility when dealing with joint criminal 
enterprise cases. Criminologists are often unable see beyond cultural explanations 
that are ill-suited to understanding matters of action. Law seems wedded to 
mystical notions of foresight. As regards the law there seems common agreement 
that joint enterprise prosecutions tend to over-criminalise secondary parties. This 
paper suggests that the current discussions around joint criminal enterprise will 
benefit from a critical engagement with analytical philosophy. The paper will 
examine a series of technical accounts of shared commitment and intention in order 
to explain the problems of joint criminal enterprise (multi-agent criminal activity).  
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Resumen 
Este artículo defiende que tanto criminólogos como abogados necesitan ofrecer una 
acción conjunta más robusta, desde el punto de vista filosófico, especialmente en lo 
que se refiere a aspectos técnicos de intencionalidad y responsabilidad, al tratar 
casos de colaboración criminal. La criminología parece incapaz de ver más allá de la 
superficialidad de las explicaciones culturales, inadecuadas para entender 
cuestiones de acción. El derecho parece aliado con nociones místicas de previsión. 
En lo que respecta al derecho, parece que existe un consenso en que los fiscales de 
asociaciones de malhechores tienden a penalizar en exceso a los cómplices. Este 
artículo sugiere que el debate actual sobre asociaciones criminales se beneficiará de 
un compromiso crítico con la filosofía analítica. El artículo analiza un conjunto de 
explicaciones técnicas de compromiso e intención compartidos para explicar los 
problemas de las asociaciones criminales (actividad criminal multi-agente). 
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1. Introduction 
It is obvious to many of us that both academic criminology and the UK criminal 
justice system need to develop a far more robust account of action when dealing 
with group offending; especially as it relates to issues of intentionality and 
responsibility. This paper asks different types of questions than is usual within 
academic Criminology and it raises technical, and philosophical, issues which are 
currently entirely missed by criminologists, who seem largely stuck in a well-worn 
cultural paradigm, which generally ignores the approach I am suggesting. This 
would only be of academic interest if the criminal justice system did not routinely 
throw up such cases concerning joint enterprise and common purpose. A new type 
of approach is required that neither falls into the criminological pitfalls of 
addressing the issue solely in terms of culture nor succumbs to the mystical legal 
notion of „foresight‟ i.e. seeing things entirely in terms of individual predictive 
mental processes. This paper has two aims: (1) to set out the work of two 
contemporary philosophers whose work on collective action has resonance in terms 
of the current debate concerning joint criminal enterprise cases, and (2) to re-
orientate the current criminological discussion away from an emphasis upon culture 
and towards a more technical account of action. In such a way it is anticipated that 
others will develop their thinking mindful of more technical issues relating to action 
than has hitherto been the case within academic criminological writing. 
It is generally assented that in the UK joint enterprise prosecutions seem to over-
criminalise secondary parties: everyone seems to agree on that. This is especially 
the case when joint enterprise prosecutions are currently being used in cases 
involving large numbers of persons; in one recent case there were twenty six co-
defendants (Williams and Clarke 2016, p. 20). Yet better defining gang 
membership, or the like, seems to completely miss the important point: that of 
accounting for culpability in criminal cases where accounting for multi-party 
agency, and individual agency, are important considerations. Gang typologies 
abound but it is difficult to see their merit in explaining the technicalities of 
agreement that are implied in the concept of joint enterprise. The big problem is 
the unwillingness of lawyers and social scientists to consider alternative 
approaches, which may be of practical use. It is the purpose of this paper to set 
out, in detail, models drawn from contemporary philosophy. It is also the purpose 
of this paper to get away from the specialness of criminal cases and uphold that 
incidents of joint criminal enterprise are but a sub-set of incidences of collective 
action. The only difference is that criminal law is only concerned with breaches of 
an agreed moral code. Once this philosophical material is considered, its application 
in real-world cases will be obvious and the consideration of joint and shared 
intentions, in a more philosophically technical fashion than hitherto within 
criminology and law, will be established. 
There are models in contemporary legal theory, notably that of Kutz, which look at 
collective intention (Kutz 2000, pp. 275-76). Kutz has highly elaborated accounts of 
“participation” and “instrumentality” both of which add further elements of 
complexity; and which some scholars have found unsatisfactory, at least in the 
original version that Kutz outlines since it tends to see collective action in a non-
reductive way and this problematizes individual agency (Sanchez-Brigado 2010, p. 
89). Instead the paper will look at two versions of what is termed reductive theory. 
This essentially amounts to the claim that: “(E)very individual acts on the basis of 
their own will, or mental state, and that we can accordingly, say that all collective 
actions, may, in turn, be reduced to a sub-set of individual actions, each enacted by 
persons in terms of their own will, or mental state … The point to hold onto is that 
those who hold a reductive theory of collective action view it as the sum of a set of 
individual actions enacted by a sub-set of wills, or mental states” (Amatrudo 2015, 
p. 111). The alternative is some version of a non-reductive theory which would 
have to hold that individuals can act at the will of another and in an unproblematic 
fashion (Roth 2004). This Rothian approach would seem to place substantial 
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limitations upon the autonomy of individual agency and is therefore not pursued in 
this paper. Michael Bratman‟s philosophical account is the most well-known we-
action theory and it maintains that shared intention is essentially an arrangement 
of individual attitudes and their corresponding relationships, or inter-relationships. 
Margaret Gilbert‟s account, on the other hand, holds that shared intentions are 
better understood in terms of normative transactions which, in turn, give rise to 
inter-personal obligations. Gilbert has a stronger sense of the collective nature of 
action. There are scholars who term Gilbert a non-reductive theorist (List and Petit 
2011, p. 194). This is to misunderstand, or rather over-state, her ideas about plural 
subjects. One may readily concede that Gilbert‟s work has a far stronger sense of 
the collective, than does Bratman, but although she sees plural subjects as acting 
as one; she is quite clear that plural subjects are always themselves divisible to a 
prior sub-set of individuals, all of whom have their own separate, and distinct, wills 
or mental states (Gilbert 1999). The aim of this paper is to emphasise a technical 
and philosophical explanation, over and against the criminological and cultural 
explanation, in accounting for group behaviour; and holds that criminal offending 
behaviour is to be understood as just a sub-set of a broader category of group 
behaviour. This paper will argue that both the accounts of Bratman and Gilbert, in 
their differing ways, offer interesting and applicable accounts to the criminologist 
and the criminal justice professional. The usefulness of using models that draw 
more heavily upon accounts of shared intentions, joint commitment and the formal 
determination of the nature of subjects (plural and individual) will surely give rise 
to better socio-legal and socio-psychological explanations of the structures of inter-
personal moral obligation involved in action: and because it concerns morality, it 
can be the basis for the development of legal interpretation in the area of multi-
agent criminal activity.  
The two approaches set out, I conclude, can give criminologists and criminal justice 
professionals a better template with which to tackle the issue of group offending 
and by insisting on the technical determination of what makes up action they afford 
a sounder basis for approaching criminal culpability. The paper will conclude by 
suggesting how criminologists, and indeed the courts, should begin to think about 
group offending. At present joint enterprise in the UK is often determined by issues 
such as bad character, foresight and prior association which seems removed from 
the main issues of determining who did what and why (Pitts 2014). Moreover, this 
kind of associational approach has, in the UK, been underscored by serious racial 
basis. Gangs are understood as a problem and gangs are seen as correlated with 
black youth. The authorities have gone after gangs and in so doing they have gone 
after black youths and the preferred legal approach has been the use of joint 
enterprise which has a very low threshold of proof (Williams and Clarke 2016). This 
approach has worryingly oriented the courts away from the main issue, which is 
that of culpability, in relation to a specific act, or acts, that are criminal. Undue 
attention has been given by social scientists and the police to typologies of persons. 
This has resulted in the over-criminalising and racial stereotyping of certain sectors 
of UK youth, urban black youth. The focus upon dangerous youths, and “gangs”, in 
current UK joint enterprise prosecutions has given rise to real, but unwarranted, 
fears in the general public that certain groups are “enemies of society” (Green and 
McGourlay 2015). It is the contention of this paper that a rigorous application of the 
principles outlined by Bratman and Gilbert will prove a far safer way of determining 
culpability in criminal cases which relate to multi-agent criminal activity; and, 
furthermore, it will avoid the moral panic seemingly at work in the current policing 
and prosecutorial arrangements, around joint enterprise crime. Bratman and Gilbert 
are not concerned with the externalities of clothing, friendship chains, rap lyrics, 
social media, and the like, which are routinely used as evidence of foresight in joint 
enterprise prosecution cases (Williams and Clarke 2016, pp. 19-20). They both, 
instead, concentrate upon the more substantial issues of action, agreement, goal 
setting and intentionality. It is important right now that attention is shifted towards 
issues of culpability and responsibility and away from the unhelpful conflation of 
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gang discourse and an aggressive joint enterprise rationale. Here we have a case 
where new input is required so no apology is made for setting this out in detail and 
in terms of material new to law and social science. 
2. Bratman: We-action theory, shared intentions and team goals 
The main focus of we-action-theories is to determine the goal of a given actor by 
asking questions about the content of their intentions in relation to the group. The 
philosopher Michael Bratman in his writing on collective action asks us to focus 
upon the matter of shared intention as the basis of we-actions. Bratman‟s work on 
we-actions, and team preferences, has garnered a lot of attention because it 
appeals to the underlying processes of reasoning involved in any collective action 
around shared intention. Moreover, his theory works with the notion that collective 
actions are still, nonetheless: “reducible to a sub-set of individual, though inter-
related, actions” (Amatrudo 2015, p. 112). Bratman‟s sense that the individual 
actor is always at the heart of any collective action has obvious, and real-world, 
moral and legal appeal. The important question for him is whether such an account 
of shared intention can also account for team goals. This amounts to asking 
whether when we say that an actor shares an intention to act that is also, 
conterminously to say, that he shares a team goal. Does the actor who shares a 
team goal also share the same intention as the others in the group? This is 
important, since having a goal and sharing an intention are completely different 
things, at least formally and in a technical sense. Moreover, using the language of 
sharing does tend to suggest a state of intimacy that is surely not present in all 
possible cases of collective action that one might come up with. Let us contrast, for 
example, the scenarios (a) that A and B go on a journey together and (b) that A 
and B share a journey together. The second account seems to suggest a far more 
personal connection that is missing in the first account. So, therefore, if sharing a 
journey, or any other experience, is stronger than collectively participating in it we 
can then reasonably argue that the sharing of an intention, or goal, is far stronger 
than just holding a goal, or intention, collectively: though in what way stronger it is 
rather difficult to set out. Here Bratman is less taken with the differences between a 
strong notion of goal sharing and its associated sense of intimacy and a weaker 
form of just sharing the same goal. He does, however, set out three elements 
which characterise shared activity and these are: (1) a commitment to mutual 
support (2) a commitment to joint activity and (3) what he terms “mutual 
responsiveness” (Bratman1993, p. 103). These three elements are, in any case, all 
focused upon achieving a goal. Bratman distinguishes here not in terms of intimacy 
or strength of sharing but in terms of two technical definitions: namely, jointly 
intentional activity (JIA) and shared cooperative activity (SCA). In his 1992 essay 
Shared Cooperative Activity Bratman sets out the example of two singers who by 
their respective, or if you like separate, actions intend to produce a duet and yet 
they fail to support each other in their separate singing activities. Here we note that 
if one of the singers ruins their singing then neither of the singers has the intention, 
in this account, to help out. This, Bratman argues, is simply (JIA) jointly intentional 
activity since (SCA) shared cooperative activity would require the further 
commitment to mutual support the other. He states: “(Any) joint action-type can 
be loaded with respect to joint intentionality but still not strictly speaking (be), 
cooperatively loaded …” (Bratman 1992, p. 337). If we follow Bratman here then 
we might ask whether his notion of team goals are cooperatively structured or just 
structured in terms of their joint intentionality. This seems an important question. 
Bratman‟s work tends to the notion of team goals which are cooperatively 
structured. It is my position that Bratman is correct and that team goals are indeed 
cooperatively structured. Actors who adhere to a team goal are surely far more 
committed than actors who are merely engaged in simple JIA. Let us set out the 
three types of outcomes that Bratman holds can be produced: (a) collectively 
successful outcomes which are characterised by each actor in a joint activity each 
performing their respective role so that a joint outcome is achieved; (b) individually 
Anthony Amatrudo   Applying Analytic Reasoning to Clarify… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 6, n. 4 (2016), 920-936 
ISSN: 2079-5971 925 
successful outcomes which are characterised by an individual actor successfully 
performing their role but in which the joint action itself is not successful due to the 
failure of one, or more, of the actors; (c) jointly unsuccessful outcomes actors 
wherein actors fail to perform their roles correctly and where there is no joint 
outcome obtained. I am using joint in a neutral sense here since it cannot be 
assumed that joint outcomes necessarily require the contribution of more than one 
actor. However, Bratman is clear that actors, who undertake any JIA, rather than 
SCA, will value their individual success over any collectively successful outcome 
(Bratman 1992, p. 337). The point Bratman makes could be contested but the point 
I take from his work is that one can, in fact, distinguish between actors involved in 
a JIA from those involved in a SCA. Moreover, that the distinction between the two, 
i.e. JIA and SCA, relates to the form their values impose upon a range of possible 
intended outcomes. Simply put, Bratman states that one can maintain that the 
possession of team preferences is itself reliant upon actors being motivated by a 
SCA and not simply a JIA: it is a moral position. 
2.1. Bratman: intentions and collective action 
Bratman‟s novel contribution to the understanding of collective action is focused 
upon his particular account of sharing intentions. Actors are involved in the 
collective action of J-ing only when they share the same intention to J and where J 
is voluntary and un-coerced. It is worth citing his classic technical formula. We 
intend to J if and only if: 
1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J; 
2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing 
sub-plans of 1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and 
because of 1a, 1b and meshing sub-plans of 1a and 1b; 
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us. (Bratman 1993, p. 106) 
The first of these conditions are what we term we-intention conditions. The second 
of these conditions he terms meshing sub-plan conditions. These meshing sub-
plans are actually broken down in greater detail by Bratman but for the sake of my 
argument we do not need to distinguish in too much detail here. Essentially, 
Bratman holds that shared intentions are not simply reducible to the set of 
attitudes possessed by individual actors but are best understood as the appropriate 
mental attitudes held by appropriate actors (Bratman 1992).  
2.2. Shared intentions 
In Bratman‟s account of J-ing the we-intention condition holds that actors A and B 
hold intentions of the technical form expressed as “I intend that we J”, where J is a 
particular joint action. The problem then surely arises about the possibility of an 
individual intending a joint action and indeed Bratman raises this himself (Bratman 
1999, p. 156). His solution is to develop a control (condition C) which states that an 
actor cannot intend an action which they do not control and also settle (condition 
S). Condition S holds that an actor may only intend an action which is up to them 
to achieve personally and resolve, i.e. settle. However, it is realistic to imagine that 
we-intention criteria could breach both the C and S constraints. Bratman is not 
overly concerned that we-intentionality poses a risk to his C and S constraints. He 
posits that credible C and S constraints (upon intentions) can indeed allow what he 
terms “other-actor conditional mediation” (Bratman 1999, pp. 156-157). For 
example, if we held that an actor X can intend to bring about an outcome q by 
undertaking an action x even where q entails that another actor Y perform an 
action y, then if X considers whether q is produced depends on the actor 
performing x. Then the actor controls whether q is produced and he also settles the 
issue of whether q is to be produced. Moreover, this is the case even if an actor is 
undertaking y is conditional on X‟s performance of x; if X knows the actor 
undertaking y is conditional on X‟s intention to perform x. In this case X can both 
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control and settle the production of q by holding the intention to x. Furthermore, 
Bratman maintains it is reasonable to state that an actor X can intend a joint action 
J, where it is the case that they believe that whether the joint action J is 
undertaken at all depends, at least to some extent, on whether the actor develops 
the intention to do their part x of a joint action J. Here it is worth citing Bratman on 
the matter because much rests on it: “When I decide that we paint together, I 
suppose that my intention that we paint will lead you so to intend as well. Does this 
mean that, strictly speaking, you don‟t get to settle the matter of our painting or, at 
least, I don‟t see you as settling the matter? Well you remain a free actor; it really 
is a decision that is up to you without which we really will not paint. I predict that, 
in part as a result of my intention, you will so decide; but that does not mean that 
you do not decide. I can predict what I know to be your free decision. I can predict 
that you will freely, in response to my intention, intend that we paint, and so settle 
the matter of our painting together. That is why I can now intend that we paint” 
(Bratman 1999, pp. 156-157). Let us state that if we say that an outcome q is 
produced by actor X‟s undertaking action x and actor Y‟s doing action y. 
Furthermore, we hold that actor Y will only undertake y at all if they see X about to 
perform x, or in the case that they considers, X has formed an intention to x. 
Bratman has argued how it is right for X to intend to bring about q by undertaking 
an action x and how X can be understood as controlling whether q is produced and 
also settle that issue of whether q is to be undertaken. Though as to the matter of 
whether it is right to hold that X intends that collectively X & Y produce q we might 
contend that X intends that he generates q in terms of undertaking X but that this 
falls some way short of the more significant claim, namely that X intends that they 
(i.e. X & Y) produce q. The scenarios are useful nonetheless in focusing on q and 
how it is achieved. 
The outstanding issue is whether it is valid, for Bratman, to move from a version of 
an other-actor conditionally mediated approach to intentionality to a fuller we-
intentionality sense of intentionality. I am not sure this is possible because we-
intentions are different, in form, from other-actor conditionally mediated intentions. 
After all we-intentions are characterised by their content being expressed by their 
not being only described by the action of an actor but by the action of other actors 
too. To set this out properly let us return to Bratman‟s classic “I intend that we J” 
formulation. Joint actions are necessarily made up of at least two contributing 
actors. If an actor X has some set of behaviours x that he can undertake and which 
create an action-type and another actor Y has a set of behaviours y that he can 
undertake and which also establish an action-type then the joint action J is made 
up of the aggregate, which we can set out as {Xx, Yy}. Furthermore, let us make 
another claim that of the compositionality of joint action-types which holds that a 
joint action J which can be undertaken by actors X and Y is dependent on some 
other set of behaviours x and some other set of behaviours y: so that J is, in turn, 
{Xx, Yy} i.e. the aggregate set. Therefore if joint action-types fulfil the 
compositionality criteria then it follows that joint action-types are themselves, in 
turn, reducible to a set of behaviours undertaken by each of the participating 
actors. This reducibility is a key point to note. 
2.3. Technical elaboration  
However, it is still unclear that every joint action-type fulfils the compositionality 
condition. For although cooperatively neutral joint action-types do need to satisfy 
the compositionality condition too in Bratman‟s scheme, let us contend that 
because Jq is cooperatively neutral it follows that there may be some joint actions 
we can term J+ that are externally the same as Jq which are cooperative activities 
and other actions that are not cooperatively derived, J-. Both J+ and J- are though 
indistinguishable with respect to external behaviour. In accounting for J-, a non-
cooperative action, we cannot surely resort to collective goals; rather J- can only 
ever be explainable by resort to the individual goals of the actors, X and Y. These 
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would entail that there are component activities x and y that the goals of X and Y 
and which together establish J- and amounts to the amalgamation of the individual 
action-types we term {Xx, Yy}. As Jq is a cooperatively neutral joint act it is 
therefore identical to J-, externally. In other words it is necessarily made up of 
action-types x and y. Of course the same applies to J+ in as much as it is too is 
composed of actions x and y. All cooperatively neutral joint actions must hold to 
this compositionality condition which maintains that any joint action-type we J is 
precisely the same as the joint action-type of the kind that I do x and you do y. 
Bratman‟s meshing sub-plans and his “common knowledge” condition enable us to 
account for cooperatively neutral joint action-type J collective actions. I do harbour 
the concern, however, that due to the compositionality criteria that Bratman 
demands that, in the end, the we-condition does lead to a definite circularity in the 
argument. 
In the classic Bratman‟s formulation of the we-intention condition: “1. (a) I intend 
that we J and (b) you intend that we J.” This holds in the case where J is a 
cooperatively neutral joint action-type. In respect to the compositionality condition 
J must be coterminous with the combination of action-types x and y. Bratman‟s 
second condition: “2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, 
and meshing sub-plans of 1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and 
because of 1a, 1b and meshing sub-plans of 1a and 1b.” We could re-draft the we-
intention (slightly) as: 1* (a) X must intend that X do x and that Y do y and that 1* 
(b) Y must intend that X do x and that Y do y. However, this also seems very 
inadequate for how can X, or Y, intend that Y, or X, perform an action? This is if we 
hold, at all, to the notion that C and S conditions are proper constraints on 
individual intentions since then we must reject the notion that X can intend that Y 
do y as X should not, on this account, understand themselves as either controlling 
(C) or settling (S), whether Y does y. It can be reasoned that X does control or 
settle, to some extent, whether Y does y. X, it can be argued, can be predicted that 
Y will do y as long as they hold that X will do x. To quote Bratman here on the S 
condition: “Suppose that Diane does not intend to raise the pressure once Abe 
intends to pump. But Diane is a kind soul and has access to the pressure valve. 
Recognizing this, Abe might be justifiably confident that if Diane knew that Abe 
intended to pump water Diane would decide to turn the pressure valve. And he 
might be confident that if he intended to pump Diane would know it. Given this 
confidence can Abe decide to pump water? Can he in the relevant sense “settle” the 
matter of whether the water is pumped? I think he can, given that he is in a 
position to predict that Diane will respond appropriately” (Bratman 1999, pp. 1954-
1955). I find this unsatisfying. Bratman never actually claims that Abe settles the 
matter of whether Diane actually turns the pressure valve and what Abe settles is 
only whether the water is pumped, no more than that. Moreover, Abe could intend 
only to bring about the outcome of water being pumped. Though it would be 
incorrect to state the situation is as Abe intended and that they (collectively) 
pumped the water: by means of his pumping and her turning. Abe may have 
settled the matter of having pumped the water, through his own actions, but he 
surely cannot also be said to settle the matter of their pumping the water. He 
cannot settle the matter of her (Diane) turning the valve; though this is an 
important consideration, surely. All we can hold is that Abe‟s intention is having 
water pumped and it being pumped. The fact that this casual connection is related 
to Diane‟s intention is not really very important even though he is aware that her 
action is indeed required. Diane‟s contribution is merely a part of the backdrop of 
things that connects Abe‟s action with a preferred outcome. Were we to say that 
Abe‟s intention is their pumping water then that suggests his being able to settle 
both his pumping and her turning. In other words that would mean that Abe sees 
himself as being able to settle Diane‟s contribution to the action which is not 
possible: at least not if she is to be properly understood as a sovereign agent. 
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Let us contend that an actor X may be able to bring about, i.e. intend, an outcome 
q that depends on their doing action x and another actor Y doing an action y. 
However, this is not the same as saying X intends that they (collectively) bring 
about q by means of one doing x and another doing y. Instead it is better to say 
that X intends to bring about q in terms of their undertaking x with the knowledge 
that their doing x will lead to Y undertaking y and the outcome q. We simply cannot 
so easily hold that X intends that they bring about q because that would require X 
to intend y and Y to intend x and this is problematic since we understand that X 
cannot control (C) or settle (S) in the case of Y‟s undertaking x. It is fair to say that 
Bratman‟s use of we-intentions is highly problematic as he cannot supply grounds 
for accepting we-intentionality without recourse to the actors themselves 
possessing we-intentions: and we have seen how such we-intentions infringe the 
practical condition that we would want to place upon our understanding of 
individual intentions. 
Bratman‟s contribution is in focusing upon an account of collective action that tends 
to reduce things to the individual actor, deliberating and acting upon their own 
individually held, though interdependent, mental states. This is tantamount to the 
deliberation and action of actors involved in individual action. The only difference 
being between cases of individual action and collective action being that in the 
latter there is reliance upon the actor intending that others enact an action rather 
than themselves enacting it alone. In short, X‟s intention that X and Y do J is 
something he can actually control if he is sure Y will come to such an intention to J. 
The dilemma is that we have noted how X‟s intention is other-actor facilitated so 
will only refer to their own action. Therefore the content, I argue, does not refer to 
collective action at all. Moreover, if the intention refers to Y‟s action as well as their 
own (X‟s) then the intention would breach the own action condition which states 
that actors cannot intend the actions of others: although it may be possible for 
individual actors to intend an outcome which is collectively performed.  
2.4. Using Bratman in joint criminal enterprise cases 
 Bratman affords us a useful insight in that he is less taken with notions of 
strong or weak goal sharing as he is with setting out three key elements that 
are important to collections of individuals when they focus upon achieving a 
goal. These are: (1) a commitment to mutual support (2) a commitment to 
joint activity and (3) mutual responsiveness. Taken together these three 
elements that define achieving a goal are replicable to joint enterprise 
cases; forming as they do, a template by which to determine matters of 
jointness and enterprise in criminal cases. 
 Bratman‟s distinction between jointly intentional activity (JIA) and shared 
cooperative activity (SCA) is helpful in determining whether team goals 
(enterprises) are cooperatively structured or just structured in terms of their 
joint intentionality. This is a technical point but it illustrates how shared 
cooperative activity is stronger and requires that members have 
commitment to mutually support the other members involved not simply 
work alongside them. Again, we note how this point could be useful in 
criminal cases where the level of commitment to mutual support is the case 
in point, notably in joint criminal enterprise cases. 
 Bratman is particularly useful when describing the collective action of J-ing; 
which we note is always voluntary and un-coerced. J being a given joint 
action. He sets out his we-intentions with regard to a notion of underlying 
meshing sub-plans. Importantly, he also notes how shared intentions may 
not simply be reduced to a set of attitudes held by individuals but have to 
possess an innate sense of being appropriate mental attitudes held by 
appropriate individuals. Bratman is tight on this point as he wants to avoid 
accident or coincidence. He wants J-ing to be clearly purposive. This sharp 
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focus upon purposiveness is clearly important in joint criminal enterprise 
cases. 
 The most important point Bratman makes that is applicable in joint 
enterprise cases is to do with reducibility i.e. that all cases of collective 
action may be reduced to constituent actions. This is surely important in 
terms of matters of culpability and responsibility. We have seen how an 
actor one actor X may have a set of behaviours x which duly create an 
action-type and how another actor Y also has a set of behaviours y that also 
establish an action-type and that it follows that when actors X and Y 
undertake a joint action J it is necessarily an aggregate that we can term 
{Xx, Yy}. Moreover, we can also hold that because of this compositionality 
of action-types that any joint action J that X and Y undertake rests on a set 
of behaviours x and y and that J is always {Xx, Yy} i.e. the aggregate set. 
This means that all joint action-types are always reducible to a set of 
behaviours undertaken by members of the group that performed it. This is 
surely important in joint enterprise cases where the responsibility may not 
be simply transferred to the group, qua group, or joint action, qua joint 
action. 
3. Gilbert: Plural subjects 
Gilbert follows John Searle in noting that the main feature of any joint action always 
relates to its internal composition (Searle 1997). Gilbert‟s originality lies in her 
understanding of what that constitutes that internal composition. For Gilbert the 
internal composition of any joint action resides in its shared intention. However, she 
defines shared intention not in terms of the form of the intention that participants 
possess; rather she understands it in terms of the inter-personal entitlements, and 
obligations that any shared intention subsequently produces. Hers is a very 
sociologically driven insight. Moreover, in contradistinction to Bratman, her work 
has a far stronger sense of the collective in collective action. It has been argued 
that her work requires an ontological commitment on the part of individuals to a 
joint commitment (Sheehy 2006, pp. 69-71).  
3.1. Social life underscored by an ethic of joint commitment 
Gilbert‟s argument is that it is only through understanding of the composition of 
groups and the beliefs and intentions they come to share that social phenomenon 
can be properly appreciated (Gilbert 1992, p. 2). Essentially Gilbert‟s argument is 
simply this: that when persons think in terms of what they intend or believe or 
have in mind as a goal that they are actually acting and thinking as members of a 
collective. There is a real ontological point here. The technical understanding has 
them as what is termed a “plural subjects of intention” or of belief (Gilbert 1992, p. 
408). For her such intentions and beliefs are what philosophers call holistic; in other 
words that they cannot be explained simply as the intentions and beliefs (or 
attitudes and actions) of individuals alone. This is important since some versions of 
holism tend to unhelpfully minimalize the role of individual agency (Harding 2007, 
p. 63). Gilbert‟s more nuanced position avoids such a pitfall. Let us set out Gilbert‟s 
formulation for understanding plural subject concepts: “Schema S. For the relevant 
psychological predicate “X” and persons P1 and P2, P1 and P2 may truly say: “We X 
with respect to PI and P2 if and only if PI and P2 are jointly committed to X-ing as a 
body” (Gilbert 2000, p. 19). 
The purpose of Schema S is to detail a basis for the technical elaboration of joint 
commitment and also as a basis for explaining all plural subject ideas. She holds 
that all commitments are reducible to two basic, in the sense of foundational, 
categories i.e. personal commitments and joint commitments. She maintains that 
all individuals may spawn personal commitments as they wish and there is no 
impediment to that whatsoever. Moreover, it follows that this also means they can 
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withdraw those commitments in the same spontaneous fashion, at will. She states: 
“… if and only if he is the sole author of a commitment and has the authority 
unilaterally to rescind it” (Gilbert 2000, p. 21). However, a joint commitment is an 
altogether more complex case. It is the commitment of the two, or more, persons, 
who are party to it, jointly. Therefore, joint commitments are much more than an 
aggregation of the relevant constituent personal commitments of the parties 
concerned. The important point to note here is that joint commitments are not 
“composite” in Gilbert‟s writing (Gilbert 2000, p. 53). The particular form of 
commitment entails the parties creating it together and therefore the only way to 
annul a joint commitment is for that also to be together since the wills of all the 
parties are necessary to achieve it (Gilbert 2000, p. 21). Consequently, if a party 
breaks their commitment they do not invalidate the original joint commitment 
rather they violate it. The commitment has status in and of itself. Gilbert 
understands that “the parties to a joint commitment are tied to one another” 
(Gilbert 1996, p. 295). We note here how Gilbert underscores how both parties are 
mutually required to annul any joint commitment. Moreover, the real point Gilbert 
advances is that the whole project of persons making mutual agreements 
necessarily spawns mutual inter-personal entitlements and obligations which are 
coterminous (Gilbert 2000, p. 26). This mutual agreement implied in joint 
commitment really matters in Gilbert; indeed it is her most important contribution. 
3.2. The plural subject: joint commitments and shared intentions 
If we return to Gilbert‟s Schema S we can flesh out the notion of the plural subject 
and its relationship with intention. Gilbert points out three features of shared 
intentions which need to be set out and related back to her ideas about the plural 
subject, since it supposedly accounts for them. Gilbert demonstrates her thinking 
by the use of an example of two people who go for a walk i.e. a walk together. She 
asks us to ponder two people who have an intention to go for a walk together. She 
then supposes what happens if after a short time one of them decides to go back 
and abruptly end the walk. Here she argues one is obviously diverging from the 
original shared intention. When this occurs the person giving up the walk would be 
rightfully chided since the person who carries on walking has a “special standing 
…by virtue of the shared intention” (Gilbert 2000, p. 16). These types of situation, 
around shared intention, throw up some interesting characteristics; that we need to 
note. First of all in the Gilbert formulation the parties, and there may be more than 
two, have an obligation to act in accordance with the shared intention: and it 
follows that such an obligation is focused upon the success of the shared intention. 
Secondly, these shared intentions also throw up what we might term positive 
entitlements and rights upon all other parties; in terms of achieving the desired 
outcome. Lastly, if a party to the shared intention acts in any way counter to its 
goal then all the other parties have the entitlement to chide them for it (Gilbert 
2000, p. 17). When thought of together these three features constitute what Gilbert 
terms the “obligation criterion” (Gilbert 1999). In such a way the individual is 
bound by their shared intention. Yet let us suppose that one of the walkers, in the 
example I give, wants to go back due to weariness. Gilbert is sure that even in such 
a case they would not be right to one-sidedly terminate the walk. Gilbert maintains 
that they would need to ask permission from their fellow walking companion to do 
that as, in the case of a shared intention, all the parties need to agree. In Gilbert, 
shared intentions can only be annulled if all parties agree (Gilbert 2000, p. 170). 
This permission criteria element is crucial to Gilbert‟s account of shared intentions 
and it underscores her criterion for determining adequacy. The other criterion of 
adequacy being what she terms the compatibility criterion. This compatibility 
criterion is simply the criterion that demands that the intentions of all the parties 
correspond not that they merely coincide. In Gilbert, shared intentions entail 
recognition of joint commitment and to the associated rights and obligations thrown 
up by it. In Gilbert shared intention is necessarily a conceptual matter (Gilbert 
2000, p. 17). 
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3.3. Gilbert on obligations and joint commitment 
In Gilbert we have noted that shared intentions and joint commitments are integral 
to one another; and also how joint commitments infer the existence of inter-
personal obligations and entitlements between the all of the parties concerned. A 
joint commitment has certain formal characteristics that we need to set out. These 
joint commitments are, first and foremost, directed in the sense that they relate to 
obligations to particular persons. It is the other person that one is obligated to and 
who, in turn, has a corresponding entitlement, or right (Gilbert 2000, p. 57, 104). 
Secondly, the obligations of joint commitment are neither moral nor prudential. She 
holds that such notions as morality and prudence could animate persons to reach 
their goals but that such notions are not strong enough to account for a strong 
enough sense of joint action (Gilbert 1992, p. 163). I do not agree with her 
underplaying of morality, especially in the form of a limited notion of political 
obligation, and on this I follow Sheehy in seeing her simple separation of morality 
from politics (Sheehy 2006, p. 70). All of which rather begs the question about 
Gilbert‟s understanding of the nature of joint commitment is? What are they if they 
are neither moral nor prudential? Essentially she sees them as associational and, 
more particularly, as political, in her sense of political. They are associational 
because they are about the associational nature of the particular joint commitment 
(Gilbert 1992, p. 394, 411). They are political, in the limited sense, that this 
association places the parties to it in a relationship comprised of mutual respect and 
support although I am unsure why that is not moral, in a broader sense (Gilbert 
2000, p. 103). Thirdly, all obligations of joint commitment are necessarily 
unconditional i.e. they are not dependent upon some other condition (Gilbert 1996, 
p. 352). Fourthly, the obligations of joint commitments are always interdependent 
so in the case of a breach by one party the other party, or parties, may be freed 
(Gilbert 2000, p. 60). The last point, which follows from the previous four, is that 
joint commitments always provide the parties with sufficient reasons for action 
(Gilbert 1996, p. 288). In Sociality and Responsibility she writes that an obligation 
is: “sufficient reason for acting” (Gilbert 2000, p. 120, 243). In recognising these 
features of the obligations of joint commitment Gilbert provides us with a coherent, 
and inter-personally normative, structure for considerations about them. The whole 
thrust of her writing on shared intention revolves around this explanation of action. 
3.4. Back to Schema S and X-ing as a body 
Let us now delve a little deeper into Gilbert‟s formulation for understanding social 
action. To recap:  
“Schema S. For the relevant psychological predicate “X” and persons P1 and P2, P1 
and P2 may truly say “We X with respect to PI and P2 if and only if PI and P2 are 
jointly committed to X-ing as a body” (Gilbert 2000, p. 19). 
The underlying joint commitment to a shared intention is the main issue in Schema 
S, as has been noted (Tuomela 2007). However, we need to understand the notion 
of “X-ing as a body” and the role it plays in Schema S. X-ing which is set out as a 
psychological notion, in Sociality and Responsibility , that underscores Gilbert‟s 
collective sense of action. For Gilbert the notion of X-ing has in mind a sense of 
collective acting as a body i.e. acting as though a single person though in fact a 
collective, i.e. plural (Gilbert 1996, p. 348). There seems to be some circularity of 
thinking here though. In which case if we were to be looking into the key notion of 
shared intention by using Schema S we would see how using “X-ing as a body” 
implies the notion of joint intention which is the precise concept it is seeking to 
explain in the first place. I do not believe this is fatal to Gilbert for it merely 
requires there to be a more rounded, i.e. fleshed out, version of “X-ing as a body.” 
If we are interested in shared intention then we could introduce a psychological 
predicate “Z” to intend. This would enable a better sense of “intending as body” and 
follow Gilbert‟s line on shared intention, as set out in Sociality and Responsibility 
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which posits: “Persons P1 and P2 have a shared intention to do A if and only if they 
are jointly committed to “intending as a body” to do A” (Gilbert 2000, p. 22). Let us 
use an example that Gilbert herself uses that of Ruth and Lil who share an intention 
to paint a kitchen together and this, she argues, involves them jointly committing 
to paint the kitchen as a body. In other words, and in terms of practical reason, 
their joint commitment gives reasons to satisfy their shared intention. As Gilbert 
explains: “(Both) has reason to act, make plans, and so on, in conformity to the 
joint commitment” (Gilbert 2000, p. 24). This account affords them reasons to act 
solely in terms of the joint commitment. What Gilbert is doing here is providing 
Ruth and Lil with reasons to fulfil their shared intention in terms of a collection of 
thought and action that relates directly to their shared intention; in the case Gilbert 
gives, to paint the kitchen together. This being the sum of actions, thoughts and 
plans that underscore the shared intention i.e. makes it possible at all. Upon this 
reasoning we can think of the term “intending as a body” as related to the 
collection of actions, thoughts and plans that enable it. So if we use the 
interpretation that I suggest then we can interpret “intending as a body” as 
explaining what it is for Ruth and Lil, together, to share an intention to paint the 
kitchen, and this will work for all versions of “X-ing as a body.” I think this is clear. 
However, it is useful here to clarify some important points relating to “X-ing as a 
body.” It is obvious that the collection of actions, thoughts and plans that pertain to 
“X-ing as a body” necessarily stipulates the content of any joint commitment. 
Moreover, as we noted earlier, Gilbert has argued that joint commitment provides 
reasons for the parties to act accordingly, in other words in line with their joint 
commitment. So the phrase “intending as a body” expresses the notion of what it 
means to act accordingly in terms of the understanding of shared intention. We also 
need to bear in mind that there is an expanded explanatory role for the 
psychological predicate “to intend” for it relates what actions, thoughts and plans 
constitute “intending as a body” at all. Gilbert makes the claim that the collection of 
actions, thoughts and plans that make up Ruth and Lil‟s intention “as a body” to 
paint the kitchen does not need their personal intentions to paint the kitchen at all 
(Gilbert 1996, p. 349). The last point to bear in mind here is that the collection of 
actions, thoughts and plans are what is technically termed disjunctive with Ruth 
and Lil‟s individual needs to enable them to complete their shared intention of 
painting the kitchen. In other words, there will indeed be a set of attitudes that are 
necessary, and prior, to their painting of the kitchen but that both Ruth and Lil only 
undertake a sub-set of those attitudes. They each only do their part in the 
“intending as a body.” The notions of “intending as a body” and “X-ing as a body” 
are central to Gilbert‟s main contribution i.e. her work on plural subjects and their 
capacity for holding a collective belief, or beliefs. She notes: “The behaviour that 
results from collective belief is driven by the concept of belief and the concept of X-
ing as a body. It is as if the participants ask themselves „what do I need to do to 
make it the case - as best I can – that I and these others together believe that p as 
a body?‟ … the answer given by our everyday understanding for the simple inter-
personal case is that, among other things, in reasoning together we say things that 
entail p rather than mot-p, we do not deny p without preamble, and so on … We 
attempt as best we can to make it true that the body we constitute relates to p the 
way any individual who believes that p relates to p” (Gilbert 1996, pp. 356-357). In 
Sociality and Responsibility she maintains that where individuals believe that they 
share intention then we can assume actions which support and reflect that fact 
(Gilbert 2000, pp.50-70). The notion of believing as a body is the keystone for 
Gilbert‟s ideas about shared intentions because shared intentions rest upon a notion 
of collective beliefs. Moreover, Gilbert shows us how there is a matrix of actions 
and thoughts that are similarly required for the development of shared attitudes. If 
we go back to Schema S to see to look at how “X-ing as a body” relates to this 
notion. What is the relationship of “We X” to “X-ing as a body” notably around 
shared intentionality that Gilbert advances in Sociality and Responsibility? I think it 
is fairly straightforward and avoids circularity. If we focus on shared intention then 
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we see a difference between the idea of shared intention and the idea of “intending 
as a body.” Shared intention is far stronger for it presumes both joint commitment 
and “intending as a body.” The notion of “intending as a body” is definitely weaker 
since though it specifies the collection of thoughts and actions necessary for shared 
intention it may indeed fall short of joint commitment. If we interpret “X-ing as a 
body” in this fashion then Schema S is not circular and, moreover, it becomes a 
useful tool. 
My interpretation of “X-ing as a body” and its importance, and practical usefulness, 
in relation to plural subject analysis is in terms of its focusing upon an 
individualistic rationales. In other words “X-ing as a body” should always to be 
understood as constituted of a collection of individual actions and thoughts. It is the 
collection of attitudes that every member of a given plural subject of X will 
possesses as a result of being jointly committed with, and to, the other members 
“X-ing as a body.” As we saw with Ruth and Lil‟s shared intention to paint a house 
this collection is made up of the sum of the individual attitudes of Ruth and Lil. It 
does not breach the holistic nature of plural subject test that Gilbert furnishes us 
with (Gilbert 1992, p. 13). This is simply because, on my reading of Gilbert, the 
holistic nature of shared attitudes is secured by the underlying joint commitment 
that they share. Moreover, joint commitment is, in this scheme, essentially a 
holistic notion. Gilbert sets this out neatly in Sociality and Responsibility where she 
states that: “… the core concept of plural subject theory is this holistic concept of 
joint commitment” (Gilbert 2000, p. 3). My reading of “X-ing as a body” prevents 
the circularity inherent in Schema S but it also has the benefit of illustrating the 
psychological aspect of shared attitudes, which I note as an important aspect of it. 
3.5. The joint action/joint commitment problem: not completely settled 
I want to conclude my remarks about Gilbert‟s work by touching upon an issue that 
persists: the knotty problem of the relationship between joint commitment and 
joint action. Gilbert‟s writing on joint action is anchored by a particular 
understanding of joint commitment. She argues that what distinguishes joint action 
from what we shall call simple co-ordinated behaviour is that joint action is one 
which is marked by joint commitment from the individuals involved in it. It is as 
straightforward as that and it is the foundation of her broader explanation of shared 
agency in general (Gilbert 1992). Her notion of joint commitment has two features 
that we must note here because they are what philosophers call primitive, that is, 
at a level of analysis that may not be further broken down. It is exemplified in 
respect to the obligations that it generates between the parties. I am not altogether 
satisfied that Gilbert‟s approach to joint commitment settles the matter of joint 
action. In regards to the primitive nature of joint commitment then I am not 
entirely convinced that we detail the proper nature of joint action by merely 
resorting to another enigmatic idea, in this case joint commitment. In regards to 
the obligations generated by joint commitment it seems, on my view, that to do 
this we do fall into a form of circularity wherein these two concepts rest upon each 
other, and unhelpfully so. If we hold that joint commitments generate obligation 
this is merely a form of explanation that seems to appeal to the notion it was 
meant to explain in the first place. The proper question concerns the nature of what 
it is to be joint, at all, and how that joint nature is distinguishable from simple co-
ordinated behaviour? This is important since joint commitment is the foundation of 
Margaret Gilbert‟s account of shared agency, indeed of her entire oeuvre 
concerning the understanding of social life and anthropology. Joint action is rolled 
out as the feature that will furnish a thorough explanation of shared intention 
(Gilbert 2000, pp.40-70). I think we have seen it is not quite up to that task. 
However, with some reservations, I believe Gilbert has nonetheless clearly 
illustrated some significant features about shared intention. She socialises her 
technical work and in so doing highlights the inter-personal nature of obligations 
associated with shared intentions. Here she is certainly correct. I am unconvinced 
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that the relationship she sets out between shared intention and obligation is an 
essential, or necessary, one but surely it is concerned with special obligations that 
are characterised by their associational and moral nature together with a thinner, in 
the sense of a more minimal, individualism (Amatrudo 2015). 
3.6. Using Gilbert in joint criminal enterprise cases 
 Gilbert‟s work has a real sociological richness in accounting for the internal 
composition of joint action. She understands joint action in terms of its 
nature being embedded in shared intention. Moreover, she elaborates her 
notion of shared intention not in conventional terms by way of focusing upon 
the form of individual intentions but, instead, in terms of the inter-personal 
entitlements and obligations that shared intentions give rise to. Accordingly, 
we note a stronger sense of the collective nature of collective action in terms 
of a real ontological commitment, by actors, to joint commitment and action. 
Her applicability in joint criminal enterprise cases is in terms of her stressing 
the fact that shared intentions also entail attendant inter-personal 
entitlements and obligations; and that such attachments are wider than the 
initial instance of a shared intention. Moreover, her argument has ontological 
force and such plural subjects of intention are conceived in such a way that 
they are not simply reducible to individual cases of intention or belief. The 
group has a holistic reality. Therefore there is a case to be made that 
groups, including criminal groups, can be held to account since they are 
composed of mutual agreements, inter-personal entitlements and obligations 
that are coterminous one with another.  
 Gilbert‟s work emphasises the social dimension of groups by highlighting the 
inter-personal nature of obligations associated with shared intentions. We 
may quibble about the precise account she offers concerning the relationship 
between shared intentions and their corresponding obligations, however, her 
emphasis upon the associational along with contention that there is also 
always an individual element to shared intentions seems to capture a truth 
about group action. It always has both individual and collective aspects and 
the problem is always in determining where to place the emphasis, as in 
joint criminal enterprise cases. 
4. Concluding remarks: the rationale for applying a more technical 
determination in multi-agent criminal activity cases 
There is a focus and an intellectual rigour to the work of Bratman and Gilbert that is 
useful and applicable, to the Social Sciences and to the prosecuting authorities in 
multi-agent, joint agency, criminal cases, notably in joint enterprise cases. Neither 
Bratman nor Gilbert offer perfect accounts but both offer what we might term 
doctrines, of a reductive type, and each afford a template with which to focus upon 
the knotty issue of joint agency. They start at first principles and address the 
foundational matters that relate to collective agency which lie beneath the issue of 
joint enterprise. They re-orientate us towards the sorts of questions that really 
matter i.e. joint action, joint commitment and shared intention. These sorts of 
questions are neutral as between persons of different kinds: they are not linked to 
the class, race or prior affiliation but to the action, or actions, at hand. Here I have 
in mind the recent report Dangerous Associations: joint enterprise, gangs and 
racism which shows how “gangs” discourse in the UK is tied to disproportionate 
policing and prosecutorial strategies that unhelpfully racialize individuals and to Lola 
Young‟s earlier report which came to a similar set of conclusions (Williams and 
Clarke 2016, Young 2014). However, criminal actions are merely a sub-set of 
actions, legally proscribed ones. Accordingly, the work of Bratman and Gilbert can 
help us understand criminal actions, notably in regard to multi-agent criminal 
actions. Criminal action is merely a sub-category of the broader category of action 
and can be understood as such. From Bratman we should take that individual 
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actors are always at the heart of any collective action. He holds that joint actions J 
may be understood of an aggregate set of behaviour, i.e. {Xx, Yy}. In other words 
there is a compositionality aspect to joint action and that it is possible to reduce 
joint actions to those performed by individual actors. Gilbert provides us with a 
more complex model; but one with a far stronger sense of the collective, than 
found in Bratman. She also holds that only when persons intend, or believe, or 
have in mind a goal can they act and think collectively and be understood properly 
in terms of her concept of the “plural subject” (Gilbert 1992). Her notion of the 
plural subject is not composite in the way that Bratman‟s work is; instead it 
presumes that the parties to any commitment create, together, a joint commitment 
which if they break they then violate (Gilbert 2000, p. 21, 53). The important thing, 
in Gilbert‟s work, is the notion that parties, to a joint commitment, are mutually 
committed to it. It binds them as they are: “tied to one another” through it (Gilbert 
1996, p. 295). The mutuality that she sets out is characterised by coterminous 
inter-personal entitlements and obligations. My interpretation of her notion of “X-
ing as a body” illustrates the richness of her psychologically, and sociologically, 
saturated sense of shared intention. Bratman and Gilbert facilitate a meditation 
upon what really matters i.e. the nature of joint action. Their stress is upon the 
action, the event and what happened. They are not concerned with broader cultural 
or phenomenological matters. When it comes to multi-agent criminal activity this is 
a safer approach. There can be joint enterprise but proving it surely involves 
working through the nature of the commitments and intentions that gave rise to it, 
not presuming it through the cultural externalities of dress, family association, 
“gang” affiliation or some such (Williams and Clarke 2016, p. 18). 
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